

0.1 Tragedy of the Commons Example

Suppose $100\sqrt{B}$ fish will be caught on a lake when B boats are fishing. Fish can be sold for \$1 but it costs \$10 to buy fuel and supplies to fish.

Fish caught per boat.

$$\frac{100\sqrt{B}}{B}$$

Profit of each boat:

$$\frac{100\sqrt{B}}{B} - 10$$

$$\pi(B) = \frac{100}{\sqrt{B}} - 10$$

$$\pi(1) = \frac{100}{1} - 10 = 90$$

$$\pi(2) = \frac{100}{\sqrt{2}} - 10 = 60.7107$$

$$\pi(3) = \frac{100}{\sqrt{3}} - 10.0 = 47.735$$

To find the individually-optimal entry of boats, we calculate the B that makes profit zero for all boats.

$$\frac{100}{\sqrt{B}} - 10 = 0$$

$$\frac{100}{\sqrt{B}} = 10$$

$$10 = \sqrt{B}$$

$$B = 100$$

$$\pi(100) = \frac{100}{\sqrt{100}} - 10 = \frac{100}{10} - 10 = 0$$

$$\pi(101) = -0.0496281$$

0.1.1 Socially Optimal

The level of entry that maximizes the joint profit of the boats:

$$(100\sqrt{B}) - 10B$$

We take the derivative with respect to B and find where marginal profit is zero:

$$\frac{\partial \left((100\sqrt{B}) - 10B \right)}{\partial B} = \frac{50}{\sqrt{B}} - 10$$

$$\frac{50}{\sqrt{B}} - 10 = 0$$

$$5 = \sqrt{B}$$

$$B = 25$$

$$\frac{\partial (100\sqrt{B})}{\partial B} = \frac{50}{\sqrt{B}} = 10$$

When 25 boats enter. Total profit is:

$$\pi = 250$$

0.2 Optimal Fishing Fee

How can we get the boats to 25?

Let's have the government impose a fee for fishing f . We want to choose f such that the individually optimal number of boats is 25.

$$\frac{100\sqrt{B}}{B} - 10 - f$$

$$\frac{100}{\sqrt{B}} - 10 - f$$

What does f need to be so that when $B = 25$ profit is zero for all boats.

$$\frac{100}{\sqrt{25}} - 10 - f = 0$$

$$\frac{100}{5} - 10 - f = 0$$

$$20 - 10 - f = 0$$

$$10 - f = 0$$

$$f = 10$$

If the government imposes a fishing fee of 10 then 25 boats will enter.

The government earns $10 * 25 = 250$ revenue from the lake and all boats earn zero profit.

0.3 Positive Externalities - Public Goods

Suppose 100 people share a park and are asked to donate money to it. (A positive externality since everyone shares the park).

Each individual has income $m = 1000000$ and their contribution is g_i .

The total contributions are $G = \sum_{i=1}^{100} g_i$. And for convenience, let $G_{-i} = G - g_i$.

$$u(g_i, G_{-i}) = (1000000 - g_i) + 100\sqrt{G} = (1000000 - g_i) + 100\sqrt{g_i + G_{-i}}$$

What contribution maximizes each individuals utility?

$$(1000000 - g_i) + 100\sqrt{g_i + G_{-i}}$$

$$\frac{\partial ((1000000 - g_i) + 100\sqrt{g_i + G_{-i}})}{\partial g_i}$$

$$\frac{\partial (1000000 - g_i + 100(g_i + G_{-i})^{\frac{1}{2}})}{\partial g_i} = -1 + 100 \frac{1}{2} (g_i + G_{-i})^{-\frac{1}{2}}$$

$$= \frac{50}{\sqrt{g_i + G_{-i}}} - 1$$

To maximize utility find where the marginal utility is zero:

$$\frac{50}{\sqrt{g_i + G_{-i}}} - 1 = 0$$

$$\frac{50}{\sqrt{g_i + G_{-i}}} = 1$$

$$50 = \sqrt{g_i + G_{-i}}$$

Best response function:

$$2500 - G_{-i} = g_i$$

$$2500 = g_i + G_{-i}$$

$$2500 = G$$

In any equilibrium, the total contributions are 2500. What is the symmetric equilibrium of this game. A g such that if everyone contributes g , it is a Nash equilibrium:

$$2500 - (99g) = g$$

$$2500 = 100g$$

$$\frac{2500}{100} = g$$

$$25 = g$$

0.3.1 Social Optimum

The social optimum is a g such that if everyone contributes g , the utility of each person is maximized.

$$u(g_i, G_{-i}) = (1000000 - g_i) + 100\sqrt{g_i + G_{-i}}$$

$$u(g, 99g) = (1000000 - g) + 100\sqrt{100g}$$

$$\frac{\partial ((1000000 - g) + 100\sqrt{100g})}{\partial g} = \frac{500}{\sqrt{g}} - 1$$

$$\frac{500}{\sqrt{g}} - 1 = 0$$

$$\frac{500}{\sqrt{g}} = 1$$

$$\sqrt{g} = 500$$

$$g = 250000$$

Utility of each individual when the government imposes a contribution of 250000:

$$\begin{aligned} u(250000, 99(250000)) &= (1000000 - 250000) + 100\sqrt{100(250000)} \\ &= 1250000 \end{aligned}$$

When individuals decide how much to contribute they all choose 25:

$$u(25, 99(25)) = (1000000 - 250000) + 100\sqrt{100(250000)} = 1004975$$