1 Monopoly

1.1 Recap

A monopolist is the only firm that sells some particular good. The way the price they can charge p is related the amount they choose to sell y is through the inverse demand.

Inverse demand is the most that consumers would pay to buy y units of a good.

$$\pi\left(y\right) = yp\left(y\right) - c\left(y\right)$$

1.2 Example

Demand: y = 100 - p

Cost: c(y) = 10y

a) Find the inverse demand function:

Inverse demand:

y = 100 - p

p = 100 - y

b) Set up the profit function for the monopolist:

$$\pi(y) = y(100 - y) - 10y$$

$$y\left(100-y\right)-10y$$

c) Find the optimal y to maximize profit:

$$\frac{\partial \left(y\left(100-y\right)-10y\right)}{\partial y} = \frac{\partial \left(100y-y^2-10y\right)}{\partial y} = \frac{\partial \left(90y-y^2\right)}{\partial y}$$

$$\frac{\partial \left(90y - y^2\right)}{\partial y} = 90 - 2y$$

Where is marginal profit zero?

$$90 - 2y = 0$$

$$y^* = 45$$

d) What does monopoly charge?

Plug y = 45 into the inverse demand:

$$p^* = 100 - 45 = 55$$

e) What is the profit they get?

Plug y = 45 into the profit function:

$$\pi (45) = 55 * 45 - 10 (45)$$

$$\pi(45) = 2025$$

1.3 Monopoly and Elasticity

1.4 Markup

1.5 Checking Markup

Suppose $\epsilon = -2$ and c(y) = 10y so mc is constant at 10. What does the monopolist charge?

Suppose $\epsilon = -1.5$ and p = 100 what is their marginal cost?

1.6 Surplus and Deadweight Loss

2 Price Discrimination

Any time you are doing something besides charging a single unit price for everyone, you are using a form of *price discrimination*.

2.1 Types

First-Degree Price Discrimination: Everyone pays their full willingness to pay. Every consumer is **identified** and charged a different price.

Examples: Airlines are kind of close (everyone pays a different price). Uber using algorithms to chrge prices (kind of close).

Second-Degree Price Discrimination: You can't identify any individual consumers but you can offer different, packages, levels, or qualitites, and let the consumers pick for themselves. Options that people self-select into.

Examples: Coach/Buisness Class on Airlines, Whiskey/Wine Levels, How close you are to the stage at a concert, club seats at a baseball game. Different lines withint the same company (luxury vs. regular clothing). Special edition albums/games.

Third-Degree Price Discrimination: Identify different **groups** and charge them different prices depending on the specifics of that group's demand. Different groups are forced to buy at different prices.

Examples: Student ticket discount, ederly discounts, Educational discounts on software.

2.2 First-Degree

In first-degree price discrimination, you charge everyone the maximum willingness to pay instead of a single price for everyone.

Thre consumer are willing to pay \$3, \$2, and \$1 respectively.

If you charge a different price to everyone you can earn \$6.

Suppose you charge the same price to everyone.

Price	# Buyers	Profit
\$1	3	\$3
\$2	2	\$4
\$3	1	\$3

2.3 Third-Degree

Suppose costs are zero.

Students $y_s = 100 - 2p$, Inverse demand $p = 50 - \frac{1}{2}y_s$ Non-students $y_n = 100 - p$, Inverse demand $p = 100 - y_n$ Combined y = (100 - 2p) + (100 - p) = 200 - 3p, Combined inverse demand: 3p = 200 - y, $p = \frac{200}{3} - \frac{y}{3}$

2.3.1 One price for everyone

Chrge one price for everyone. Don't treat the groups differently:

$$\pi (y) = y \left(\frac{200}{3} - \frac{y}{3}\right)$$
$$\pi (y) = \frac{200}{3}y - \frac{y^2}{3}$$
$$\frac{\partial \left(\frac{200}{3}y - \frac{y^2}{3}\right)}{\partial y} = \frac{200}{3} - \frac{2}{3}y$$
$$\frac{200}{3} - \frac{2}{3}y = 0$$
$$\frac{2}{3}y = \frac{200}{3}$$
$$y^* = 100$$

To find the price, plug this back into the combined inverse demand:

$$p = \left(\frac{200}{3} - \frac{100}{3}\right) = \frac{100}{3.0} \approx 33.33$$
$$\pi \left(\frac{100}{3}\right) = 100 \left(\frac{100}{3}\right) \approx 3333.33$$

2.3.2 Profit for Student

Profit function for students. Try to set ll \boldsymbol{y}_s units to the students:

$$\pi\left(y_s\right) = y_s\left(50 - \frac{1}{2}y_s\right)$$

$$\frac{\partial \left(50y_s - \frac{1}{2}y_s^2\right)}{\partial y_s}0$$

$$50 - y_s = 0$$

$$y_s = 50$$

Plug this back into the student inverse demand to get their price:

$$p_s = \left(50 - \frac{1}{2}\left(50\right)\right) = 25$$

Profit in the student market:

$$\pi(y_s) = 50 * 25 = 1250$$

2.3.3 Market for Non-Students

Inverse demand $p_n = 100 - y_n$.

a) Set up the profit function.

$$\pi\left(y_n\right) = y_n\left(100 - y_n\right)$$

b) find optimal y_n

$$\frac{\partial \left(100y_n - y_n^2\right)}{y_n} = 0$$

$$100 - 2y_n = 0$$

$$y_n = 50$$

c) determine what price to chrge non-students

Plug this optimal y_n into the non-student inverse demand:

$$p_n = 100 - y_n$$

$$p_n = 50$$

d) find the profit earned in this market.

$$\pi(y_n) = 50 * 50 = 2500$$

What is to total profit of selling to the groups separately?

 $\pi_s = 1250$ $\pi_n = 2500$ $\pi_s + \pi_n = 3750$

The profit from combining the groups:

 $\pi=3333.33$

2.4 Bundling

Bundling can happen when a firm sells multiple types of products where the demand for those products might be complementary.

Force consumers to buy the bundle.

Example: Television Packages, Microsoft Office

Suppose costs are zero.

	Shirt	Pants	Both
Consumer 1	50	30	80
Consumer 2	10	80	90

Price pants and shirts.

What price should we charge for shirts to maximize profit?

Shirts:

Try to sell to both:

Charge \$10. Sell two shirts. \$20 profit.

Try to sell to one:

Charge \$50. Sell one shirt. \$50 profit.

Pants:

Try to sell to both:

Charge \$30. Sell two pants. \$60 profit.
Try to sell to one:
Charge \$80. Sell one pants. \$80 profit.
Bundle
Try to sell to both:
Charge \$80. Sell two outfits. \$160 profit.
Try to sell to one:
Charge \$90. Sell one outfits. \$90 profit.

2.5 Two-Part Tariff

Demand for each consumer: y = 10 - p. Cost is zero.