

1 Homotheticity

$x \succsim y \Rightarrow tx \succsim ty$ for all $t \geq 0$.

A (smooth) utility function is homothetic if and only if the indifference curves are parallel along a rays through the origin.

$$MRS(x) = MRS(tx)$$

$$-\frac{\frac{\partial(u(x_1, x_2))}{\partial x_1}}{\frac{\partial(u(x_1, x_2))}{\partial x_2}} = -\frac{\frac{\partial(u(tx_1, tx_2))}{\partial x_1}}{\frac{\partial(u(tx_1, tx_2))}{\partial x_2}}$$

$$u(x_1, x_2)$$

$$u(2x_1, 2x_2) = u(x_1, x_2)$$

$$x_1^{\frac{1}{2}} x_2^{\frac{1}{2}}$$

$$-\frac{\frac{\partial\left(x_1^{\frac{1}{2}} x_2^{\frac{1}{2}}\right)}{\partial x_1}}{\frac{\partial\left(x_1^{\frac{1}{2}} x_2^{\frac{1}{2}}\right)}{\partial x_2}} = -\frac{x_2}{x_1}$$

$$MRS(2x_1, 2x_2) = -\frac{2x_2}{2x_1} = -\frac{x_2}{x_1}$$

Since the MRS only depends on the ratio of x_1 and x_2 , the utility function is homothetic.

$$u(tx_1, tx_2) = (tx_1)^{\frac{1}{2}} (tx_2)^{\frac{1}{2}} = t^{\frac{1}{2}} t^{\frac{1}{2}} (x_1)^{\frac{1}{2}} (x_2)^{\frac{1}{2}} = t (x_1)^{\frac{1}{2}} (x_2)^{\frac{1}{2}} = tu(x_1, x_2)$$

Here is another utility function with the same preferences but that has increasing returns to scale:

$$x_1 x_2$$

Because Homotheticity is a property of the preferences and not the utility function, it is an ordinal property and it is invariant to increasing transformations of the utility function.

2 Example

Suppose: $X = \{(2, 0), (0, 2), (4, 0), (0, 4), (1, 1), (2, 2)\}$.

Suppose preferences are **anti-symmetric** ($x \sim x$) but for all other pairs of distinct bundles either ($x \succ y$) or ($y \succ x$) and complete and transitive.

1. What can assume about \succ if preferences are weakly monotonic?

$$(2, 2) \succ (1, 1)$$

1. What can assume about \succ if preferences are strictly monotonic?

Suppose: $X = \{(2, 0), (0, 2), (4, 0), (0, 4), (1, 1), (2, 2)\}$.

$$(2, 2) \succ (1, 1), (4, 0) \succ (2, 0), (0, 4) \succ (0, 2), (2, 2) \succ (0, 2), (2, 2) \succ (2, 0)$$

2. Suppose $(2, 0) \succ (0, 2)$ and preferences are convex. What can we infer?

$$(1, 1) \succ (0, 2)$$

Suppose we assume preferences are weakly monotonic, convex, anti-symmetric, complete and transitive and that $(2, 0) \succ (0, 2)$.

$$(2, 2) \succ (1, 1) \succ (0, 2)$$

By transitivity we can infer $(2, 2) \succ (0, 2)$. This preference is not ensured by weak monotonicity, we need to leverage the convexity and transitivity to get it.

3. Suppose we observe that $(2, 0)$ is the choice from the set $\{(2, 0), (1, 1), (0, 2)\}$ and preferences are complete, anti-symmetric, strictly monotonic, convex, and homothetic. What can we infer?

From monotonicity:

$$(2, 2) \succ (1, 1), (4, 0) \succ (2, 0), (0, 4) \succ (0, 2), (2, 2) \succ (0, 2), (2, 2) \succ (2, 0)$$

From the choice of $(2, 0)$:

$$(2, 0) \succ (1, 1), (2, 0) \succ (0, 2)$$

From this and convexity:

$$(2, 0) \succ (1, 1) \succ (0, 2)$$

From homotheticity:

$$(4, 0) \succ (2, 2) \succ (0, 4)$$

What are the possible preference orderings?

This is impossible:

$$(2, 0) \succ (1, 1) \succ (0, 2)$$

$$(4, 0) \succ (2, 2) \succ (0, 4)$$

By strict monotonicity: $(2, 2) \succ (2, 0)$. Thus, $(4, 0) \succ (2, 2)$ have to be at the top of the ordering. Where can $(0, 4)$ be? It has to be above $(0, 2)$ but we don't know how it compares to $(1, 1)$ or $(2, 0)$. This gives the following possibilities:

$$(4, 0) \succ (2, 2) \succ (0, 4) \succ (2, 0) \succ (1, 1) \succ (0, 2)$$

$$(4, 0) \succ (2, 2) \succ (2, 0) \succ (0, 4) \succ (1, 1) \succ (0, 2)$$

$$(4, 0) \succ (2, 2) \succ (2, 0) \succ (1, 1) \succ (0, 4) \succ (0, 2)$$

If we observe choice from $\{(0, 4), (1, 1)\}$ and $\{(0, 4), (2, 0)\}$ we will know the entire rank ordering.

3 Constrained Optimization - Some Intuition

Max $u(x_1, x_2)$ subject to $p_1x_1 + p_2x_2 \leq m$

$$u(x_1, x_2) - \lambda(p_1x_1 + p_2x_2 - m)$$